QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems by Dietz, Michael
RICE UNIVERSITY 
QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone 
Operating Systems 
by 
Michael Dietz 
A THESIS SUBMITTED 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
Master of Science 
APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE: 
~ 
Dan Wallach, Chair 
Associate Professor of Computer Science 
AlanL. Cox 
Associate Professor of Computer Science 
and Electrical and Computer Engineering 
A.Jv3r9l_ 
v ' David B. Johnson 
Professor of Computer Science and 
Electrical and Computer Engineering 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 
December, 2011 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems 
by 
Michael Dietz 
Smartphone applications(apps) often run with full privileges to access the network and sen-
sitive local resources, making it difficult for remote systems to have any trust in the prove-
nance of network connections they receive. Even within the phone, different apps with 
different privileges can communicate with one another, allowing one app to trick another 
into improperly exercising its privileges (a confused deputy attack). This thesis presents 
two new security mechanisms built into the Android operating system to address these is-
sues. First, the call chain of all interprocess communications are tracked, allowing an app 
the choice of operating with the diminished privileges of its callers or to act explicitly on its 
own behalf. Additionally, a lightweight signature scheme allows any app to create a signed 
statement that can be verified anywhere inside the phone. Both of these mechanisms are 
reflected in network RPCs, allowing remote endpoints visibility into the state of the phone 
when an RPC is made. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
On a smartphone, applications(apps) are typically given broad permissions to make net-
work connections, access local data repositories, and issue requests to other apps on the 
device. To date there have been two approaches to managing the permissions granted to 
the applications installed on a user's smartphone. 
For Apple's iOS devices, the only mechanism that protects users from malicious apps 
is the vetting process for an app to get into Apple's app store. (Apple also has the ability 
to remotely delete apps, although it's something of an emergency-only system.) An iPhone 
user might rely on Apple's manual policing of applications to protect themselves from 
malicious apps, but any iPhone app might have its own security vulnerabilities, perhaps 
through a buffer overflow attack, which can give an attacker full access to the entire phone. 
The Android platform, in contrast, has no significant vetting process before- an app is 
posted to the Android Market. Instead, applications from different authors run with differ-
ent Unix user ids, containing the damage if an application is compromised. (In this aspect, 
Android follows a design similar to SubOS [15].) This approach to operating system secu-
rity prevents a security vulnerability in one application from affecting other applications on 
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the device. However, it does nothing to defend a trusted app from being manipulated from 
a malicious app via IPC (i.e., a confused deputy attack. Likewise, there is no mechanism 
to prevent an IPC callee from misrepresenting the intentions of its caller to a third party or 
the operating system itself. 
This mutual distrust is present in the interactions between many mobile applications. 
Consider the example of a mobile advertisement system. The application hosting an ad 
would rather the ad run in a distinct process, with its own user-id, so bugs in the ad system 
do not impact the host app. Similarly, the ad system might not trust its host app to display 
the ad correctly and it must be concerned with the ability for a host app to generate fake 
clicks in order to inflate the host app's ad revenue. 
1.2 Overview 
To address these concerns, this thesis introduces QUIRE, a set of low-overhead security 
mechanisms that provides important context in the form of provenance and operating sys-
tem managed data security to local and remote apps communicating by IPC and RPC, 
respectively. QUIRE uses two techniques to provide security to communicating applica-
tions. 
First, QUIRE transparently annotates IPCs occurring within the phone such that the 
recipient of an IPC request can observe the full call chain associated with the request. When 
an application wishes to make a network RPC, it might well connect to a raw network 
socket, but it would lack credentials that QUIRE builds into the OS, which can speak to 
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the state of an RPC in a way that an app cannot forge. (This contextual information can 
be thought of as a generalization of the information provided by the recent HTTP Origin 
header [3], used by web servers to help defeat cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks.) 
Second, QUIRE uses simple cryptographic mechanisms to protect data moving over 
IPC and RPC channels. QUIRE provides a mechanism for an app to tag an object with 
cheap message authentication codes, using keys that are shared with a trusted OS service. 
When data annotated in this manner moves off the device, the OS can verify the signature 
and speak to the integrity of the ~essage in the RPC. 
1.3 Practical applications of QUIRE. 
The mechanisms presented by this thesis allow a variety of applications already present 
in the smart phone ecosystem to be improved upon. Consider the case of in-application 
advertising. A large number of free applications include advertisements from services like 
Google's AdMob. AdMob is presently implemented as a library that runs in the same 
process as the application hosting the ad, creating trivial opportunities for the application 
to spoof information to the server, such as claiming an ad is displayed when it isn't, or 
claiming an ad was clicked when it wasn't. In QUIRE, the advertisement service runs as a 
separate application and interacts with the displaying app via IPC calls. The remote appli-
cation's server can now reliably distinguish RPC calls coming from its trusted agent, and 
can further distinguish legitimate clicks from forgeries, because every UI event is tagged 
with a MAC, for which the OS will vouch. 
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Consider also the case of payment services. Many smartphone apps would like a way 
to sell things, leveraging payment services from PayPal, Google Checkout, and other such 
services. It would be useful to enable a use case where an app sends a payment request to a 
local payment agent, which can then pass the request on to its remote server. The payment 
agent must be concerned with the payee app trying to issue fraudulent payment requests, 
so it needs to validate requests with the user. Similarly, the main app might be worried 
about the payment agent misbehaving, so it wants to create unforgeable "purchase orders" 
which the payment app cannot corrupt. All of this can be easily accomplished with the new 
mechanisms in QUIRE. 
Finally, consider the case of permission escalation. The Android security architecture 
assumes that an app that wishes to steal GPS information from a user must request both 
Internet and fine grained location permissions. This permission set should act as a red flag 
to users that the app may be up to no good so they will not install it. However, a malicious 
application that requests Internet permission can issue an IPC request to an unprotected 
interface of an honest app that has GPS permission. With no context about the call chain 
leading to an IPC call, the Android platform has no way to detect that the honest app is 
being used as a confused deputy and will gladly reveal the user's GPS information to the 
honest app and ultimately the malicious app. QUIRE attaches provenance to IPC calls, 
defeating these confused deputy attacks. 
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1.4 Challenges. 
For QUIRE to be successful, it must accomplish a number of goals. The design must be 
sufficiently general to capture a variety of use cases for augmented internal and remote 
communication. Toward that end, the design for QUIRE build on many concepts from 
Taos [32], including its compound principals and logic of authentication (see Chapter 2). 
The implementation must be fast. Every IPC call in the system must be annotated and must 
be subsequently verifiable without having a significant impact on throughput, latency, or 
battery life. (Chapter 3 describes QUIRE's implementation, and Chapter 5 presents perfor-
mance measurements.) QUIRE expands on related work from a variety of fields, including 
existing Android research, web security, distributed authentication logics, and trusted plat-
form measurements (see Chapter 6). QUIRE is expected to serve as a platform for future 
work in secure UI design, as a substrate for future research in web browser engineering, 
and as starting point for a variety of improved smart phone applications (see Section 7). 
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Chapter 2 
Design 
Fundamentally, the design goal of QUIRE is to allow apps to reason about the call-chain 
and data provenance of requests, occurring on the host platform via IPC or on a remote 
server via RPC, before committing to a security-relevant decision. This design goal is 
shared by a variety of other systems, ranging from Java's stack inspection [28, 29] to many 
newer systems that rely on data tainting or information flow control (see, e.g., [18, 19, 9]). 
QUIRE, much like in stack inspection, wishes to support legacy code without much, if any, 
modification. However, unlike stack inspection, QUIRE shouldn't modify the system to 
annotate and track every method invocation, nor suffer the runtime costs of dynamic data 
tainting as in TaintDroid [9]. Likewise, QUIRE should operate correctly with apps that 
have natively compiled code, not just Java code (an issue with traditional stack inspection 
and with TaintDroid). Instead, QUIRE need only track calls across IPC boundaries, which 
happen far less frequently than method invocations, and which already must pay significant 
overheads for data marshaling, context switching, and copying. 
Stack inspection has the property that the available privileges at the end of a call chain 
represent the intersection of the privileges of every app along the chain (more on this in 
Section 2.3), which is good for preventing confused deputy attacks but doesn't solve a 
variety of other problems such as validating the integrity of individual data items as they 
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are passed from one app to another or over the network. For that, QUIRE need semantics 
akin to digital signatures, but needs to be much more efficient than the relatively slow 
digital signature operations (more on this in Section 2.4). 
2.1 Comparisons to information flow 
QUIRE's design is necessarily less precise than dynamic taint analysis, but it's also very 
flexible. It can avoid the need to annotate code with static security policies, as would be 
required in information flow-typed systems like Jif [21]. Similarly QUIRE does not need to 
poly-instantiate services to ensure that each instance only handles a single security label as 
in systems like DStar/HiStar [33]. Instead, in QUIRE, an application that handles requests 
from multiple callers will pass along an object annotated with the originator's context when 
it makes downstream requests on behalf of the original caller. 
Likewise, where a dynamic tainting system like TaintDroid [9] would generally allow 
a sensitive operation like learning the phone's precise GPS location to occur, but would 
forbid it from flowing to an unprivileged app; QUIRE will carry the unprivileged context 
through to the point where the dangerous operation is about to happen and will then forbid 
the operation. An information flow approach is thus more likely to catch comer cases (e.g., 
where an app caches location data, so no privileged call is ever performed), but is also more 
likely to have false positives (where it must conservatively err on the side of flagging a flow 
that is actually just fine). The tradeoff is that a programmer in an information flow system 
would need to tag these false positive comer cases as acceptable, whereas a programmer in 
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QUIRE would need to add additional security checks to corner cases that would otherwise 
be allowed. 
In stack inspection, where this tracking is implicit with metadata on the call stack, this 
context can be lost in cases where requests are queued for later dispatch. In QUIRE, how-
ever, the caller's context can be captured and stored alongside queued requests, allowing 
the original security context to be resurrected for subsequent IPC dispatches. 
Finally, by adopting stack inspection's security semantics, QUIRE can gain its pro-
tections against confused deputy attacks [13]. When a sensitive privilege is about to be 
executed, such as learning the fine GPS location of the phone, the operating system service 
that protects the GPS information knows the full IPC call stack and can inspect the permis-
sions of the apps in the call chain in order to deny such requests. However, in cases where 
the calling app wants to explicitly act on its own behalf rather than on behalf of a calling 
app, it can do so by actively choosing to drop the existing call chain, thereby assuming its 
own privileges rather than its callers. 
2.2 Authentication logic and cryptography 
In order to reason about the semantics of QUIRE, there must be a formal model to express 
what the various operations in QUIRE will do. Toward that end, QUIRE uses the Abadi 
et al. [1] (hereafter "ABLP") logic of authentication, as used in Taos [32]. In this logic, 
principals make statements, which can include various forms of quotation ("Alice says 
that Bob says X") and authorization (e.g., "Alice says that Bob speaks for Alice"). ABLP 
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nicely models the behavior of cryptographic operations, where cryptographic keys speak 
for other principals, and apps within the QUIRE system can use this model to reason about 
cross-process communication on a device or over the network. 
ABLP statements can be concretely represented in a variety of different syntaxes like 
SDSI* which are sensible for remote procedure calls but would be too slow to marshal for 
every local IPC. In QUIRE, as in traditional stack inspection, statements are always of the 
form "App says X" or, more generally use quoting, i.e., "App 1 says App2 says App3 says 
X", which would model the call stack where App3 called App2 which then called App 1. 
For the remainder of the current section, we will flesh out QUIRE's IPC and RPC design 
in terms of ABLP and the cryptographic mechanisms we have adopted. 
2.3 IPC provenance 
The goal of QUIRE's IPC provenance system is to allow endpoints that protect sensitive 
resources, like a user's fine grained GPS data or contact information, to reason about the 
complete IPC call-chain of a request for the resource before granting access to it. 
QUIRE realizes this goal by modifying the Android IPC middleware layer to automat-
ically build calling context as an IPC call-chain is formed. Consider a call-chain where 
three principals A, B, and C, are communicating. If A calls B which then calls C without 
keeping track of the call-stack, C only knows that B initiated a request to it, not that the call 
from A prompted B to make the call to C. This loss of context can have significant security 
*http:// groups.csail.mit.edu/ cis/sdsi.html 
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implications in a system like Android where permissions are directly linked to the identity 
of the principal requesting access to a sensitive resource. 
To address this, QUIRE's design is for any given callee to retain its caller's call-chain 
and pass this to a downstream callee. The downstream callee will automatically have its 
caller's principal prepended to the ABLP statement. In the above scenario, C will receive 
a statement "B says A says Ok", where Ok is an abstract token representing that the given 
resource is authorized to be used. It's now the burden of C (or QUIRE's privilege manager, 
operating on C's behalf) to prove Ok. As Wallach et al. [29] demonstrated, this is equivalent 
to validating that each principal in the calling chain is individually allowed to perform the 
action in question. 
2.3.1 The confused deputy problem 
With this additional context, QUIRE defeats confused deputy attacks; if any one of the prin-
cipals in the call chain is not privileged for the action being taken, permission is denied. 
Figure 2.1 shows this in the context of an evil application, lacking fine-grained location 
privileges, that is trying to abuse the privileges of a trusted mapping program, which hap-
pens to have that privilege. The mapping application, never realizing that its helpful API 
might be a security vulnerability, naively and automatically passes along the call chain to 
the location service. The location service then uses the call chain to prove (or disprove) 
that the request for fine-grained location show be allowed. 
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As with traditional stack inspection, there will be tin1es that an app genuinely wishes to 
exercise a privilege, regardless of its caller's lack of the same privilege. Stack inspection 
solves this with an enablePrivilege primitive that, in the ABLP logic, simply doesn't pass 
along the caller's call stack information. The callee, after privileges are enabled, gets only 
the caller's identity. (In the example of Figure 2.1, the tlusted mapper would drop evil 
app from the call chain, and the location service would only hear that the map application 
wishes to use the service.) 
Userspace 
UID: 1 UID: 2 UID: 3 
Call Chain: () Call Chain: (1) Call Chain: (1 ,2) 
Call TM( ... ) Call LA( ... ) VerifyCaiiChain( ... ) 
/ 
EviiApp Trusted Mapper / ,..Location Provider 
/ 
Operating System / 
Call chain: (1 ,2,3) 
1 ~no GPS 
2 --+GPSokay 
3 ~GPSokay 
Privilege Manager 
Figure 2.1: Defeating confused deputy attacks. 
QUIRE's design is, in effect, an example of the "security passing style" transforma-
tion [29], where security beliefs are passed explicitly as an IPC argument rather than passed 
implicitly as annotations on the call stack. One beneficial consequence of this is that a 
callee might well save the statement made by its caller and reuse it at a later time. This 
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situation may arise if the callee queues requests for later processing and wishes to properly 
modulate the privilege level of each outgoing request according to the call chain informa-
tion sent by the calling app. 
QUIRE's modifications to the Android IPC system push the IPC call-stack into out-
bound IPC messages and allow the callee principal to operate with this passed call-stack 
by default. This means that principals in the QUIRE system automatically quote the call-
chain that lead to their invocation when issuing outbound IPC requests. This approach is 
conceptually very similar to the "security passing" Java stack inspection model; however 
QUIRE operates at a much higher level than traditional stack inspection by treating appli-
cations as principals (with unique Unix user-id identifiers) and monitoring cross-process 
communication rather than method invocations. 
2.3.2 Security analysis 
Although apps, by default, will pass along call chain information without modification, 
QUIRE allows a caller to forge the identities of its upstream callers. No cryptography need 
be used to prevent this. Although enabling a caller to misrepresent its antecedent call chain 
would seem to be a serious security vulnerability there is no incentive for a caller to lie, 
since nothing it quotes from its antecedent callers can increase its privileges in any way. 
Conversely, QUIRE's design requires the callee to learn the caller's identity in an un-
forgeable fashion. When the callee prepends the "Caller says" tokens to the statement it 
hears from the caller, using information that is available as part of every Android Binder 
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IPC, any lack of privileges on the caller's part will be properly reflected when the privileges 
for the trusted operation are later evaluated. 
The design outlined thus far is is very lightweight; without the need for cryptography, 
QUIRE can construct and propagate IPC call chains with very little impact on the overall 
IPC performance (see Chapter 5). 
2.3.3 Resolving call chains and the confused deputy problem 
Consider the case where principal A calls B which then calls Con A's behalf, with C ul-
timately utilizing some security-sensitive resource X. C wants to know that the request is 
authorized and might be worried that B is being tricked by an evil A. QUIRE, does not (yet) 
include an explicit theorem prover, as in Taos, but here is how the logical reasoning over 
QUIRE provenance statements could protect against misuse of B. 
If there were a rule that C protects some resource X ("C controls X"), this would require 
C to reduce a call chain to Ok(X) before releasing X to the calling principal. C can arrive at 
this Ok(X) reduction by applying OS granted permissions, in the form of OS says (B ==? X) 
which shows that the OS has granted B permission to access X, to the ABLP representation 
of the requesting call chain. 
Consider a simple confused deputy problem where B has permission to access X the but 
no there is no corresponding permission for A. If A attempts to use Bas a confused deputy 
to access X, B need only quote A in its request to drop its permission set to that of B n A, 
the intersection of the permission sets of A and B. When C receives the request, it hears 
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"B says A says X". Since B is authorized but A is not, the theorem prover can derive that 
access to X is not authorized with this call chain. Conversely, if B makes the call by itself, 
A will not be mentioned anywhere, and B acts with its own permission set. This makes it 
possible to derive that access to X is allowed. In this way, QUIRE grants B the ability to 
drop privilege as a consequence of receiving a call from A. 
2.4 Verifiable statements 
Stack inspection semantics are helpful but not sufficient for many security needs. There are 
a variety of scenarios where an app will need semantics equivalent to digital signatures, but 
with much better performance than public-key cryptographic operations. 
Definition A verifiable statement is a 3-tuple [P,M,A(M)p] where Pis the principal that 
said message M, and A(M)p is an authentication token that can be used by the Authority 
Manager OS service to verify P said M. In ABLP, this tuple represents the statement "P 
saysM." 
In order to track the provenance of IPC method invocations, QUIRE creates a verifiable 
statement whenever a cross-application call is made using Android's "Binder" IPC system. 
The implementation of the code generator responsible for producing the stub and proxy 
code that handles the concrete construction of the statements is discussed in Chapter 3. 
In order to operate without requiring slow public-key cryptographic operations, QUIRE 
must instead use message authentication codes (MAC). MAC functions, like HMAC-SHAl, 
run several orders of magnitude faster than digital signature functions like DSA, but MAC 
15 
functions require a shared key between the generator and verifier of a MAC. To avoid an N2 
key explosion, QUIRE instead has every application share a key with an OS hosted, trusted 
authority manager. As such, any app can produce a statement "App says M", purely by 
computing a MAC with its secret key. However, for a recipient app to verify the received 
statement it must send the statement to the authority manager for verification. If, after 
computing a symmetric operation to the one the calling app used to create the verifiable 
statement, the authority manager says the MAC is valid, then the second app will believe 
the validity of the statement. 
Consider a scenario with two local applications, A and B, and a remote service C, rep-
resented by principals PA, PB, and Pc respectively. The local applications wish to commu-
nicate with the remote service and the remote service C wants to verify that A generated 
the message C received. A first requests a shared secret from the authority manger. The 
authority manager stores the mapping PA = kA and returns kA to A. Application A then 
creates object M and attaches toM a statement SM = [PA,D], where D = MAC(M)kA, a 
message authentication code keyed to the shared secret kA. Application A then establishes 
an IPC connection to Band transmits M to application B. The statement SM attached toM 
can now be used by any on-phone recipient of M to verify the authenticity of M with the 
help of the OS, as discussed in Section 2.5. 
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2.5 OS verification of statements 
The fundamental assumption that allows mutually untrusted userspace applications to ver-
ify the provenance of incoming IPC messages using QUIRE is that userspace applications 
trust the operating system. A userspace application can then use a trusted OS service to 
act as a third party mediator that verifies statements made by other userspace applications 
running on the system. Is it reasonable to trust the operating system for this? Consider the 
alternative. If an app cannot trust what the operating system tells it about other applications, 
then it cannot trust much of anything. 
To allow applications to verify statements from other applications, QUIRE exposes a 
new Authority Manger system service. This service speaks with the authority of the OS 
and can be used by userspace applications to tum an unauthenticated statement received 
from the IPC system into a statement said by the OS, having verified the authenticity of the 
statement. 
The Authority Manager service must first allow userspace applications to request a 
shared secret with the OS to be used by those applications to compute MAC authenticators 
over statements they wish to make. The Authority Manager service stores the mapping 
between userspace applications and their secret MAC keys in order to later authenticate 
statements made by that application. 
The example outlined above established that the principal PA had already requested a 
shared secret and that the authority manager possessed the mapping PA = kA, of principals 
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to shared secrets. We left off with application B issuing a request for the Authority Manager 
to authenticate the message M with attached statement SM = [PA,D]. 
The Authority Manager begins the verification of M by looking up the shared secret 
kA associated with PA. It then computes D' = MAC(M)k8 , and the computed value of D' 
is then compared to the D that was included in SM. This operation has the end result 
of comparing the authentication token SM computed by PA when M was created with an 
authentication token computed by the Authority Manager using the provided M delivered 
to B. The message M can therefore be verified by the OS upon delivery to any principal P 
on the phone regardless of how many IPC channels M has moved through. 
The end result of this verification of M by theAuthorityManager allows B to believe the 
statement AuthorityManager says (PA says M). However, this statement is only meaning-
ful to an application on the phone. Section 2.6 discusses the steps required to communicate 
on phone provenance to a remote end point. 
2.6 RPC attestations 
When moving from on-device IPCs to Internet RPCs, some of the properties that exist on 
the device disappear. Most notably, the receiver of a call can no longer open a channel to 
talk to the Authority Manager, even if they did trust itt. To combat this, QUIRE's design re-
quires an additional "network provider" system service, that can speak over the network on 
tuke it or not, with NATs, firewalls, and other such impediments to bi-directional connectivity, we can 
only assume that the phone can make outbound TCP connections, not receive inbound ones. 
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behalf of statements made on the phone. This will require it to speak with a cryptographic 
secret that is not available to any applications on the phone. 
One method for getting such a secret key is to have the phone manufacturer embed, in 
storage only accessible to the OS kernel, an X.509 certificate which they sign along with the 
corresponding private key. This certificate can be used to establish a client-authenticated 
TLS connection to a remote service, with the remote server using the presence of the client 
certificate, as endorsed by a trusted certification authority, to provide confidence that it is 
really communicating with the QUIRE phone's operating system, rather than an applica-
tion attempting to impersonate the OS. With this attestation-carrying encrypted channel in 
place, RPCs can then carry a serialized form of the same statements passed along in QUIRE 
IPCs, including both call chains and signed statements, with the network provider trusted 
to speak on behalf of the activity inside the phone. 
All of this can be transmitted in a variety of ways, such as a new HITP header. Regular 
QUIRE applications would be able to speak through this channel, but the new HTTP head-
ers, with their security-relevant contextual information, would not be accessible to or forge-
able by the applications making RPCs. (This is analogous to the HITP origin header [3], 
generated by modem web browsers, but it carries more detailed contextual information 
from the caller.) 
The strength of this security context information is limited by the ability of the device 
and the OS to protect the key material. If a malicious application can extract the private key, 
then it would be able to send messages with arbitrary claims about the provenance of the 
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request. This leads us inevitably to techniques from the field of trusted platform modules 
(TPM), where stored cryptographic key material is rendered unavailable unless the kernel 
was properly validated when it booted. TPM chips are common in many of today's laptops 
and could well be installed in future smartphones. 
Even without TPM hardware, Android phones generally prohibit applications from run-
ning with full root privileges, allowing the kernel to protect its data from malicious apps. 
This is a sound design until users forcibly "root" their phones, which is commonly done 
to work around carrier-instituted restrictions such as forbidding phones from freely relay-
ing cellular data services as WiFi hotspots. Regardless, most users will never "root" their 
phones, preventing normal applications, even if they want superuser privileges, from get-
ting them and then compromising the network provider's private keys. 
Privacy. An interesting concern arises with the QUIRE design: Every RPC call made 
from QUIRE uses the unique public key assigned to that phone. Presumably, the public key 
certificate would contain a variety of identifying information, thus making every RPC per-
sonally identify the owner of the phone. This may well be desirable in some circumstances, 
notably allowing web services with Android applications acting as frontends to completely 
eliminate any need for username/password dialogs. However, it's clearly undesirable in 
other cases. To address this issue in a broader context, the Trusted Computing Group has 
designed what it calls "direct anonymous attestation":l:, using cryptographic group signa-
tures to allow the caller to prove that it knows one of a large group of related private keys 
:j:http:/ /www.zurich .ibm.com/security /daa/ 
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without saying anything about which one. A production implementation of QUIRE could 
switch from TLS client-auth to some form of anonymous attestation without a significant 
performance impact. 
An interesting challenge, for future work, is being able to switch from anonymous 
attestation, in the default case, to classical client-authentication, in cases where it might 
be desirable. One notable challenge of this would be working around users who will click 
affirmatively on any "okay I cancel" dialog that's presented to them without ever bothering 
to read it. Perhaps this could be finessed with an Android privilege that is requested at the 
time an application is installed. Unprivileged apps can only make anonymous attestations, 
while more trusted apps can make attestations that uniquely identify the specific phone. 
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Chapter3 
Implementation 
QUIRE is implemented as a set of extensions to the existing Android 2.3 Java runtime li-
braries and Binder IPC system. The Authority Manager and Network Provider are trusted 
components of the QUIRE system and therefore implemented as OS level services, while 
the modified Android interface definition language code generator provides IPC stub code 
that allows applications to propagate and adopt an IPC call-stack. The result, which is 
implemented in around 1300 lines of Java and C++ code, provides locally verifiable state-
ments, IPC provenance, and authenticated RPC for QUIRE-aware applications and back-
ward compatibility for existing Android applications. 
3.1 On- and off-phone principals 
The Android architecture sandboxes applications such that apps from different sources run 
as different Unix users. Standard Android features also allow us to resolve user-ids into 
human-readable names and permission sets, based on the applications' origins. Based on 
these features, the prototype QUIRE implementation defines principals as the tuple of a 
user-id and process-id. QUIRE includes the process-id component to allow the recipient 
of an IPC method call to stipulate policies that force the process-id of a communication 
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partner to remain unchanged across a series of calls. (This feature is largely ignored in the 
applications discussed in this thesis, but it might be useful later.) 
While principals defined by user-id/process-id tuples are sufficient for the identification 
of an application on the phone, they are meaningless to a remote service. QUIRE therefore 
resolves the user-id/process-id tuples used in IPC call-chains into an externally meaningful 
string consisting of the marshaled chain of application names when RPC communication is 
invoked to move data off the phone. This lazy resolution of IPC principals allows QUIRE to 
reduce the memory footprint of statements when performing IPC calls, at the cost of extra 
effort when RPCs are performed. 
3.2 Authority management 
The Authority Manager discussed in Chapter 2 is implemented as a system service that 
runs within the operating system's reserved user-id space. The interface exposed by the 
service allows userspace applications to request a shared secret, submit a statement for ver-
ification, or request the resolution of the principal included in a statement into an externally 
meaningful form. 
When an application requests a key from the Authority Manager, the Authority Man-
ager places a record in a table mapping user-id I process-id tuples to the key. It is important 
to note that a subsequent request from the same application will prompt the Authority Man-
ager to create a new key for the calling application and replace the previous stored key in 
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the lookup table. This prevents attacks that might try to exploit the reuse of user-ids and 
process-ids as applications come and go over time. 
3.3 Verifiable statements 
Chapter 2 introduced the idea of attaching an OS verifiable statement to an object in order 
to allow principals later in a call-chain to verify the authenticity and integrity of a received 
object. 
The implementation of this abstract concept involves a Parcelable statement object that 
consists of a principal identifier and an authentication token. When this statement object is 
attached to a Parcelable object, the annotated object contains all the information necessary 
for the Authority Manager service to validate the authentication token contained within the 
statement. Therefore the annotated object can be sent over Android's IPC channels and 
later delivered to the QUIRE Authority Manger for verification by the OS as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
QUIRE's verifiable statement implementation establishes the authenticity of message 
with a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) digest rather than a heavyweight 
public key digital signature. This implementation decision drastically reduces the cost 
of creating and verifying a statement, as discussed in Chapter 5 while still providing the 
authentication and integrity semantics required by the QUIRE design. 
Fast authenticator creation A fundamental assumption of our decision to use Hashed 
Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) rather than public key digital signatures as our 
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cryptographic mechanism for authentication was that the Android-provided HMAC library 
code would yield results within a constant factor of OpenSSL's baseline numbers. In prac-
tice, doing HMAC-SHAl in pure Java was still slow enough to be an issue. 
The prototype QUIRE implementation resolves this issue by using the native C imple-
mentation of SHAl-HMAC from OpenSSL and exposing it to Java code as a Dalvik VM 
intrinsic function, rather than a JNI native method. This eliminated unnecessary copying 
and runs at full native speed (see Section 5.2.1 for more details). 
3.4 Code generator 
The key to the stack inspection semantics that QUIRE provides is an extension to the An-
droid Interface Definition Language (AIDL) code generator. This piece of software is 
responsible for taking a generalized interface definition and creating stub and proxy code 
to facilitate Binder IPC communication over the interface as defined in the AIDL file. 
The QUIRE code generator differs from the stock Android code generator in that it adds 
directives to the marshaling and unmarshaling phase of the stubs that pull the call-chain 
context from the calling app and attach it to the outgoing IPC message for the callee to 
retrieve. These directives allow for the "quoting" semantics that form the basis of a stack 
inspection based policy system. 
The modified code generator will take an authenticated method like auth void noop () 
and will expand this method into two parallel Java methods void noop () and void noop(Statement 
authenticator) defined in the proxy. 
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The first generated method presents a proxy interface that allows the application to 
make the method call without attaching any existing provenance to the outgoing mes-
sage. The semantics of this method call result in the delivery of a statement representing 
{Application says Method(Arguments) } to the application at the other end of the IPC 
method call. 
The QUIRE modified code generator enables this functionality by injecting pre-processing 
code that creates and marshals the outgoing statement into the generated proxy methods. 
The modified proxy method first requests a shared secret, if it doesn't already have one, 
from the authority manager and stores it for later use. It then marshals the outgoing Parcel 
representation of the IPC call and arguments into a byte array and computes the SHAl 
HMAC digest of the marshaled data with its stored shared secret. Finally, a Parcelable 
Statement object is created with the uid/pid principal of the calling process, the marshaled 
outgoing message, and the computed HMAC digest. The statement is then appended to the 
outgoing Parcel and sent to the recipient application. 
The prototype implementation of the QUIRE AIDL code generator requires that an 
application developer specify that an AIDL method become "QUIRE aware" by defining 
the method with a reserved auth flag in the AIDL input file. This flag informs the QUIRE 
code generator to produce additional proxy and stub code for the given method that enables 
the propagation and delivery of the call-chain context to the specified method. A production 
implementation would pass this information implicitly on all IPC calls. 
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Chapter4 
Applications 
4.1 PayBuddy 
To demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE for RPCs, consider a micropayment application 
called PayBuddy: a standalone Android application which exposes an activity to other 
applications on the device to allow those applications to request payments. By exposing 
this functionality as a separate application and using the QUIRE mechanisms for commu-
nication, PayBuddy can avoid many types of attacks which circumvent user approval of 
payments. 
To demonstrate how PayBuddy works, consider the example shown in Figure 4.1. Ap-
plication ExampleApp wishes to allow the user to make an in-app purchase. To do this, 
ExampleApp creates and serializes a purchase order object and signs it with its MAC key 
kA. It then sends the signed object to the PayBuddy application, which can then prompt 
the user to confirm their intent to make the payment. After this, Pay Buddy passes the pur-
chase order along to the operating system's Network Provider. At this point, the Network 
Provider can verify the signature on the purchase order and also that the request came from 
the PayBuddy application. It then sends the request to the PayBuddy.com server over a 
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client-authenticated HTTPS connection. The contents of ExampleApp's purchase order 
are included in an HTTP header as is the call chain ("ExampleApp, Pay Buddy"). 
Userspace 
MAC Key: kA MAC Key: kpa 
PurchaseOrder po { 
RPCPayBuddy.com( ... ) Cost c ... 
Payee p ... } -,. 
MACkA(po) / 
ExampleApp / iii"'PayBuddy 
/~ 
Operating System / 
"ExampleApp says ... " kA -+"ExampleApp' 
"PayBuddy says ... " 
'· .. 
kpa -+ "PayBuddy'' 
I/ 
/ Net Provider Auth Manager 
/ 
PayBuddy.com 
Figure 4.1: Message flow in the Pay Buddy system. 
At the end of this the remote endpoint, Pay Buddy.com, knows the following: 
• The request came from a patticular device with a given certificate. 
• The purchase order originated from ExampleApp and was not tampered with by the 
PayBuddy application. 
• The PayBuddy application approved the request (which means that the user gave 
their explicit consent to the purchase order). 
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If PayBuddy.com accepts the transaction, it can take whatever action accompanies the 
successful payment (e.g., returning a transaction ID that ExampleApp might send to its 
home server in order to download a new level for a game). 
Security analysis This design has several curious properties. Most notably, the Exam-
pleApp and the Pay Buddy app are mutually distrusting of each other. 
The Pay Buddy app doesn't trust the payment request to be legitimate, so it can present 
an "okay/cancel" dialog to the user. In that dialog, it can include the cost as well as the 
ExampleApp name, which it received through the QUIRE call chain. The PayBuddy app 
will only communicate with the PayBuddy.com server if the user approves the transaction. 
Similarly, ExampleApp has only a limited amount of trust in the PayBuddy app. By 
signing its purchase order and including a unique order number of some sort, a compro-
mised PayBuddy app cannot modify or replay the message. Because the OS's Network 
Provider is trusted to speak on behalf of both ExampleApp and the Pay Buddy app, the re-
mote PayBuddy.com server gets ample context to understand what happened on the phone 
and deal with cases where a user later tries to repudiate a payment. 
Lastly, the user's PayBuddy credentials are never visible to ExampleApp in any way. 
Once the PayBuddy app is bound, at install time, to the user's matching account on Pay-
Buddy.com, there will be no subsequent username/password dialogs. All the user will see 
is an okay/cancel dialog. Once users are accustomed to this, they will be more likely to 
react with skepticism when presented with a phishing attack that demands their Pay Buddy 
credentials. (A phishing attack that's completely faithful to the proper PayBuddy user in-
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terface would only present an okay/cancel dialog, which yields no useful information for 
the attacker.) 
4.2 Click fraud prevention 
Current Android-based advertising systems, such as AdMob, are deployed as a library that 
an app includes as part of its distribution. So far as the Android OS is concerned, the app 
and its ads are operating within single domain, indistinguishable from one another. Fur-
thermore, because advertisement services need to report their activity to a network service, 
any ad-supported app must request network privileges, even if the app, by itself, doesn't 
need them. 
From a security perspective, mashing these two distinct security domains together into 
a single app creates a variety of problems. In addition to requiring network-access privi-
leges, the lack of isolation between the advertisement code and its host creates all kinds of 
opportunities for fraud. The hosting app might modify the advertisement library to generate 
fake clicks and real revenue. 
This sort of click fraud is also a serious issue on the web, and it's typically addressed 
by placing the advertisements within an iframe, creating a separate protection domain and 
providing some mutual protection. To achieve something similar with QUIRE, we needed to 
extend Android's UI layer and leverage QUIRE's features to authenticate indirect messages, 
such as UI events, delegated from the parent app to the child advertisement app. 
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Currently, many advertisement-driven apps for Android embed in their view hierarchy 
third party libraries which display advertisements, and revenue is generated when a user 
clicks on the advertisements. However this leads to several problems: 
1. Violation of principle of least privilege: The applications, which do not need to use 
the network and thus do not need any permission for using network, are forced to 
have the permission so that the advertisement views can download advertisements 
and send the click data back to server. Given that a large number of free apps use 
advertisements for monetization, almost every free app on a device ends up with 
network permission, even when it is not needed. 
2. No isolation between advertisement views and the hosting app: As the advertisement 
code runs with same privileges as the hosting application, a potentially malicious or 
buggy implementation of advertisement code can steal or corrupt the data accessed 
by the hosting application. 
3. Click fraud: A hosting application can synthesize clicks or modify clicks and pass 
them as genuine clicks by user on advertisements to increase its revenue. 
The above problems are largely unique to smartphones due to prevalence of the advertisement-
driven revenue model of apps and can be best addressed by providing an OS-level mech-
anism specially designed for applications to host advertisements in an isolated and secure 
manner. 
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Design challenges Fundamentally a design that uses QUIRE to solve the above issues re-
quires two separate apps to be stf}.cked (see Figure 4.2), with the primary application on top, 
and opening a transparent hole through which the subordinate advertising application can 
be seen by the user. This immediately raises two challenges. First, how can the advertising 
app know that it's actually visible to the user, versus being obscured by the application? 
And second, how can the advertising app know that the clicks and other UI events it re-
ceives were legitimately generated by the user, versus being synthesized or replayed by the 
primary application. 
Figure 4.2: The host and advertisment apps. 
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Verifying events With the stacked app design, motion events are delivered to the host 
app, on top of the stack. The host app then recognizes when an event occurs in the adver-
tisement's region and passes the event along. To complicate matters, Android 2.3 reengi-
neered the event system to lower the latency, a feature desired by game designers. Events 
are now transmitted through shared memory buffers, below the Java layer. 
Userspace 
Delegate( e) ,. VerifyMAC( e) 
' ' ~dViewApp ~ Sample App 
Operating System 
' " ClickEve nt e = { kEM-+ "E.M." Timet 
Position x,y 
... } 
MACkEM(e) 
Event Manager Auth Manager 
Figure 4.3: Secure event delivery from host app to advertisement app. 
This design leverages QUIRE's signed statements. A prototype implementation of the 
design modified the event system to augment every MotionEvent (as many as 60 per second) 
with one of QUIRE's MAC-based signatures. This means apps don't have to worry about 
tampering or other corruption in the event system. Instead, once an event arrives at the 
advertisen1ent app, it first validates the statement, then validates that it's not obscured, and 
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finally validates the timestamp in the event, to make sure the click is fresh. This process is 
summarized in Figure 4.3. 
At this point, the local advertising application can now be satisfied that the click was 
legitimate and that the ad was visible when the click occurred and it can communicate that 
fact over the Internet, unspoofably, with QUIRE's RPC service. 
In total, the prototype click fraud prevention prototype added around 500 lines of Java 
code for modifying the activity launch process and small modifications to the user input 
system to generate signed events. While this prototype implementation does not deal with 
every possible scenario (e.g., changes in orientation, killing of the advertisement app due 
to low memory, and other such things) it still demonstrates the feasibility of hosting of 
advertisement in separate processes and defeating click fraud attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Performance analysis 
5.1 Experimental methodology 
All of the following experiments were performed on the standard Android developer phone, 
the Nexus One*, which has a 1GHzARMcore (aQualcommQSD 8250), 512MB ofRAM, 
and 512MB of internal Flash storage. The experiments were conducted with the phone dis-
playing the home screen and running the normal set of applications that spawn at start up. 
The default "live wallpaper" was replaced with a static image to eliminate any background 
CPU load. 
All of the following benchmarks are measured using the Android Open Source Project's 
(AOSP) Android 2.3 ("Gingerbread") as pulled from the AOSP repository on December 
21st, 2010. QUIRE is implemented as a series of patches to this code base. We used an 
unmodified Gingerbread build for "control" measurements and compared that to a build 
with our QUIRE features enabled for "experimental" measurements. 
*http:/ /www.google.com /phone/ static/ en_US- nexusone_tech...specs. htm I 
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5.2 Microbenchmarks 
5.2.1 Signed statements 
The first micro benchmark of QUIRE measures the cost of creating and verifying statements 
of varying sizes. To do this, an application was created to generate random byte arrays of 
varying sizes from 10 bytes to 8000 bytes and measured the time to create 1000 signatures 
of the data, followed by 1000 verifications of the signature. Each set of measured signa-
tures and verifications was preceded by a priming run to remove any first-run effects. The 
average of the middle 8 out of 10 such runs were taken for each size. The large number 
of runs is due to variance introduced by garbage collection within the Authority Manager. 
Even with this large number of runs the impact of the aggressive garbage collector was 
not fully accounted for leading to some jitter in the measured performance of statement 
verification. 
The results in Figure 5.1 show that statement creation carries a small fixed overhead 
of 20 microseconds with an additional cost of 15 microseconds per kilobyte. Statement 
verification, on the other hand, has a much higher cost: 556 microseconds fixed and an 
additional 96 microseconds per kilobyte. This larger cost is primarily due to the context 
switch and attendant copying overhead required to ask the Authority Manager, via expen-
sive IPC, to perform the verification. However, with statement verification being a much 
less frequent occurrence than statement generation, these performance numbers are well 
within the QUIRE performance targets. Statement verification is expected to be performed 
much less often than statement creation because an app will optimistically want to sign 
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Figure 5.1: Statement creation and vetification time vs payload size. 
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each outgoing message (particularly for any messages involving user input) however, only 
a few of the signed messages will eventually lead to a security critical action in which the 
verification is performed. 
5.2.2 IPC call-chain tracking 
The next micro-benchmark measures the additional cost of tracking the call chain for an 
IPC that otherwise perforn1s no computation. In order to measure this a service with a 
pair of methods was implemented. One method uses the QUIRE IPC extensions and one 
petf orms standard Android IPC. These n1ethods both allow us to pass to them a byte anay 
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of arbitrary size. We then measured the total round trip time needed to make each of 
these IPC calls. These results are intended to den1onstrate the slowdown introduced by the 
QUIRE IPC extensions in the worst case of a round trip null operation that takes no action 
on the receiving end of the IPC method call. 
The perforn1ance timings for the first IPC call of each 1un were discarded to remove 
any noise that could have been caused by previous activity on the system. Each data point 
in Figure 5.2 was obtained by performing 10 1uns of 100 trials each at each size point, with 
sizes ranging from 0 to 6336 bytes in 64-byte increments. 
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These results show that the overhead of tracking the call chain for one hop is around 70 
microseconds, which is a 21% slowdown in the worst case of doing no-op calls. 
The effect of adding a second hop into the call chain was also measured. This was done 
by having two services, where the first service n1erely calls the second service, which once 
again performs no action. 
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Figure 5.3: Roundtrip two step IPC time vs payload size. 
The results in Figure 5.3 show that the overhead of tracking the call chain for two hops 
avreages 145 microseconds, which is a 20% slowdown in the worst case (or, in other words, 
the overhead introduced by the QUIRE IPC call chain tracking appears to be a constant 
factor above stock Android IPC, regardless of the call chain length). This suggests that 
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tracing moderate-sized (under 10) app call chains will not noticeably degrade performance 
(a penalty of under a microsecond for a call chain involving 10 applications). Call chains 
of longer than 4 to 5 hops are not expected within the Android ecosystem as the Android 
OS attempts to aggressively limit the number of tunning applications to under six. 
5.2.3 IPC to RPC principal resolution 
Statement Depth Time (J.ls) 
1 770 
2 1045 
4 1912 
8 4576 
Table 5.1: IPC principal to RPC principal resolution time. 
The next microbenchn1ark measures the cost of converting from an IPC call chain into 
a serialized form that is meaningful to a remote service. This includes the IPC overhead in 
asking the systen1 services to perform this conversion. 
The results of this microbenchmark, as shown in Tablereffig:ipctorpc show that even 
for very long statement chains, the extra cost of the IPC to RPC principal conversion is 
a small number of milliseconds, which is should be dwarfed by the cost of maintaining a 
TLS network connection. 
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5.3 HTTPS RPC benchmark 
To understand the impact of using QUIRE for calls to remote servers, a micro benchmark 
was implemented to perform some simple RPCs using both QUIRE RPC and a regular 
HTTPS connection. A simple echo service was called that returned a parameter that was 
provided to it. This metric allows for the measurement of the effect of payload size on 
latency. These tests were run on a small LAN with a single wireless router and server 
plugged into this router, and using the phone's WiFi antenna for connectivity. Each data 
point is the mean of 10 Iuns of 100 trials each, with the highest and lowest times thrown 
out prior to taking the mean to remove anomalies. 
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The results in Figure 5.4 show that QUIRE adds an additional overhead which averages 
around 6 ms, with a maximum of 13.5 ms, and getting smaller as the payload size increases. 
This extra latency is small enough that it's irrelevant in the face of the latencies experienced 
across typical cellular Internet connections, as a typical cellular 30 connection should ex-
perience significantly more latency than the test setup used for this microbenchmark. 
5.4 Throughput benchmarks 
In addition to the microbenchmarks, it's useful to observer QUIRE's performance in a larger 
benchmark that would stress the QUIRE IPC system in a more realistic scenario. Toward 
that end, consider the problem where an Android application that hosts a third-party ad 
service might wish to create synthetic click events on the advertisements in order to gain 
fraudulent income from the advertising server (see Section 4.2 for implementation details). 
In order to prevent this attack, an advertising application must establish that the click 
event it received indirectly from the host application was legitimately generated by the OS 
and therefore corresponds to a legitimate click by the user on the screen. 
The goal for this QUIRE benchmark was to use the existing Android system with 
QUIRE's modifications and correctly reject synthesized clicks. A simple click injection pre-
vention system was created that attaches statement chains to all UI "touch" events. These 
events are eventually delivered to a GUI view object which acts as the advertising service's 
share of the screen real-estate. When this view receives a touch event, it passes it to the 
system service to verify whether the clicks have valid statement chain from the OS. 
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The throughput of the prototype click injection system was tested by modifying An-
droid to remove its 35 event-per-second hard-coded limit on touch events and observing 
the total time taken to perform 100 thousand synthetic touch events running as fast as the 
hardware will allow. 
Android QUIRE Ratio (QUIRE/Android) 
291.7 224.6 0.770 
Table 5.2: Average touch event throughput in events per second. 
The results in Table 5.2 show that attaching verifiable statement chains to the touch 
event delegation system results in a 25 percent loss of throughput when compared to the 
unmodified Android touch delegation system. The QUIRE prototype still allows 220 events 
per second, which is much higher than the existing limit of 35 events per second in Android, 
even though the QUIRE version of the ad application performs an extra IPC operation in 
order to verify every click delivered to the end-point application. 
5.5 Battery benchmarks 
Finally, the effect on the battery of signing and verifying ever click in a QUIRE aware 
ad application must be considered. The PowerTutor [34] utility was used to monitor the 
battery utilization during a run of the click event throughput micro benchmark. Table 5.3 
shows that the additional hashing and data copying introduced by our authenticated IPC 
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accounts for a .6 millijoule (80%) increase in power consumption per click. We also mea-
sured the power consumed by the operating system and its services while this was running 
as presented in Table 5.4. OS power consumption increases 38 percent relative to stock 
Android while userspace power consumption only increased 4 percent relative to stock an-
droid. This result shows that most of the negative impact on battery is contributed by the 
IPC to the OS Authority Manager during statement verification rather than the creation of 
verifiable statements in userspace stub code. 
Android QUIRE Ratio (QUIRE/Android) 
0.72 1.29 1.80 
Table 5.3: Average battery utilization in mJ per click. 
Subsytem Android QUIRE Ratio (QUIRE/Android) 
OS 210.80 290.73 1.38 
Userspace 95.6 99.3 1.04 
Table 5.4: Subsystem battery utilization breakdown in mW, lOOk clicks. 
5.6 Analysis 
These benchmarks demonstrate that adding call-chain tracking can be done without a sig-
nificant performance penalty beyond that of performing standard Android IPCs. Also, the 
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cost of creating a signed statement is low enough that it can easily be performed for every 
touch event generated by the system. Finally, our RPC benchmarks show that the addi-
tion of QUIRE does not cause a significant slowdown relative to standard TLS-encrypted 
communications. 
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Chapter 6 
Related work 
6.1 Smart phone platform security 
As mobile phone hardware and software increase in complexity, the security of the code 
running on a mobile devices has become a major concern. 
The Kirin system [10] and Security-by-Contract [8] focus on enforcing install-time 
application permissions within the Android OS and .NET compact framework, respectively. 
These approaches to mobile phone security allow a user to protect themselves by enforcing 
blanket restrictions on what applications may be installed or what installed applications 
may do, but do little to protect the user from applications that collaborate to leak data or to 
protect applications from one another. 
Saint [23] extends the functionality of the Kirin system to allow for runtime inspection 
of the full system permission state before launching a given application. Apex [22] presents 
another solution for the same problem, where the user is responsible for defining run-time 
constraints on top of the existing Android permission system. Both of these approaches 
allow users to specify static policies to shield themselves from malicious applications but 
don't allow apps to make dynamic policy decisions. 
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CRePE [7] presents a solution that attempts to artificially restrict an application's per-
missions based on environmental constraints such as location, noise, and time-of-day. Al-
though CRePE considers contextual information to apply dynamic policy decisions, it does 
not attempt to address privilege escalation attacks. 
6.1.1 Dynamic taint analysis on Android 
The TaintDroid [9] and ParanoidAndroid [24] projects present dynamic taint analysis tech-
niques for preventing runtime attacks and data leakage. These projects attempt to tag ob-
jects with metadata in order to track information flow and enable policies based on the path 
that data has taken through the system. TaintDroid's approach to information flow control 
is to restrict the transmission of tainted data to a remote server by monitoring the outbound 
network connections made from the device and disallowing tainted data to flow along the 
outbound channels. The goal of QUIRE differs from that of taint analysis in that QUIRE 
allows applications to protect sensitive data at the source as opposed to at the network 
output. 
The low-level approaches used to tag data also differ between these projects. TaintDroid 
enforces its taint propagation semantics by instrumenting an application's DEX bytecode 
to tag with a taint value every variable, pointer, and IPC message that flows through the 
system. In contrast, QUIRE's approach requires only the IPC subsystem be modified, with 
no reliance on instrumented code; therefore QUIRE can work with applications that use 
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native libraries and avoids the overhead imparted by instrumenting code to propagate taint 
values. 
6.1.2 Information flow control 
The idea of tracking and annotating the flow of information throughout an operating sys-
tem is not new. Many existing information flow control systems, such as JFlow [18], use 
a combination of dynamic taint tracking and tagged data to enforce security guarantees on 
the data flowing through the system. QUIRE differs from existing information flow con-
trol systems in that it doesn't focus on propagating taint but rather attempts to preserve 
the originator of a request throughout the lifetime of a call chain. QUIRE also relies on 
process isolation and augments IPC channels to track provenance rather than relying on 
augmentations to an applications code to propagate taint tags. 
6.1.3 Decentralized information flow control 
A branch of the information flow control space focuses on how to provide taint tracking 
in the presence of mutually distrusting applications and no centralized authority. Meyer's 
and Liskov's work on decentralized information flow control (DIFC) systems [19, 20] was 
the first attempt to solve this problem. Systems like DEFCon [17] and Asbestos [27] use 
DIFC mechanisms to dynamically apply security labels and track the taint of events mov-
ing through a distributed system. These projects and QUIRE are similar in that they both 
rely on process isolation and communication via message passing channels that label data. 
However, DEFCon cannot provide its security guarantees in the presence of deep copying 
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of data; while QUIRE can work in an environment where deep copying is allowed since 
QUIRE defines policy based on the call chain and ignores the data contained within the 
messages forming the call chain. Asbestos avoids the deep copy problems of DEFCon by 
tagging data at the IPC level. Although Asbestos and QUIRE use a similar approach to data 
tagging, the tags are used for very different purposes. Asbestos aims to prevent data leaks 
by enabling an application to tag its data and disallow a recipient application from leaking 
information that it received over an IPC channel, while QUIRE attempts to preemptively 
disallow data from being leaked by protecting the resource itself, rather than allowing the 
resource to be accessed and then blocking leakage at the taint sink. 
6.2 Operating system security 
QUIRE is closely related to Taos [32], which presents a solution to data provenance and 
secure channels in distributed systems. Our design replaces Taos's expensive digital signa-
tures with relatively inexpensive HMAC authenticators. This approach was also considered 
as an optimization in practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [6]. However a PBFT im-
plementation using HMAC authenticators cannot scale to large numbers of nodes because 
each node requires a unique shared secret with every other node. QUIRE is able to use 
HMACs as its authentication mechanism because each application need only register a 
shared secret with a central point of authority, the operating system. Network communi-
cation in QUIRE replaces the HMACs with statements made through a cryptographically 
authenticated channel. 
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6.3 Trusted platform modules 
Our use of a central authority for the authentication of statements within QUIRE shares 
some similarities with projects in the trusted platform module space. Terra [ 11] and vTPM [ 4] 
both use virtual machines as the mechanism for enabling trusted computing. The architec-
ture of multiple segregated guest operating systems running on top of a virtual machine 
manager is similar to the Android design of multiple segregated users running on top of a 
common OS. However, these approaches both focus on establishing the user's trust in the 
environment rather than trust between applications running within the system. 
6.4 Web security 
Many of the problems of provenance and application separation addressed in QUIRE are 
directly related to the challenge of enforcing the same origin policy from within a web 
browser. Google's Chrome browser [2, 25] presents one solution where origin content 
is segregated into distinct processes. Microsoft's Gazelle [30] project takes this idea a 
step further and builds hardware-isolated protection domains in order to protect principals 
from one another. MashupOS [14] goes even further and builds OS level mechanisms for 
separating principals while still allowing for mashups. 
All of these approaches are more directed at protecting principals from each other than 
building up the communication mechanism between principals. QUIRE gets application 
separation for free by virtue of Android's process model and focuses on the expanding the 
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capabilities of the communication mechanism used between applications on the phone and 
the outside world. 
6.5 Remote procedure calls 
Weigold et al. [31] provides an overview of some of the challenges and threats surrounding 
authenticated RPC. There are many other systems which would allow for secure remote 
procedure calls from mobile devices. Kerberos [16] is one solution, but it involves placing 
too much trust in the ticket granting server (the phone manufacturers or network providers, 
in our case). Another potential is OAuth [12], where services delegate rights to one an-
other, perhaps even within the phone. This seems unlikely to work in practice, although 
individual QUIRE applications could have OAuth relationships with external services and 
could provide services internally to other applications on the phone. 
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Chapter7 
Future work 
QUIRE can be a platform for conducting a variety of interesting security research around 
smartphones, and as such there are a number of applications that map well onto the QUIRE 
system. 
Usable and secure UI design The IPC extensions QUIRE introduces to the Android op-
erating system can be used as a building block in the design and implementation of a secure 
user interface. Chapter 5 has already demonstrated how the system can efficiently sign ev-
ery UI event, allowing for these events to be shared and delegated safely. 
Any opportunity to eliminate the need for username/password dialogs from the ex-
perience of a smartphone user would appear to be a huge win, particularly because it's 
much harder for phones to display traditional trusted path signals, such as modifications to 
the chrome of a web browser. Instead, app developers can leverage the low-level client-
authenticated RPC channels to achieve high-level single-sign-on goals. The PayBuddy 
application demonstrates the possibility of building single-sign-on systems within QUIRE. 
Extending this to work with multiple CAs or to integrate with OpeniD I OAuth services 
would seem to be a fruitful avenue to pursue. 
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7.1 Policy for apps 
QUIRE allows apps to determine if a calling app should have access to a resource based 
on the state of the incoming call chain and the permissions of the apps contained within 
that call chain. This data, when combined with a theorem prover could be used to pro-
vide dynamic, adaptive protection for sensitive resources rather than protection via static 
policies. 
7.2 License verification 
Google's Android team recently published an API for applications that wish to use the 
Android Marketplace application to establish the licensing validity of an installed instance 
of an application. This license verification system consists of two parts. First, the An-
droid Marketplace application, which facilitates the remote communication with Google's 
servers in order to look up the licensing information for a phone, and secondly, the Li-
cense Verification Library (LVL), a bit of third party code that facilitates communication 
locally with the Marketplace app. Immediately after the announcement of this system, an 
attack was presented [5] in which an attacker can disassemble and modify the function of 
the LVL so that it interprets a response from the Marketplace application that indicates the 
application using the LVL is not licensed for the phone as an approval for use rather than 
disapproval. 
This attack could be easily prevented with the QUIRE extensions to Android's IPC 
mechanism. The LVL would run as a separate service, with its own user-id, on the Android 
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phone. Any application that wishes to make use of the LVL would query it, which would 
then either query the Android Marketplace or keep a local policy cache, ultimately yielding 
a signed statement in return to the caller. 
7.3 Web browsers 
While QUIRE is targeted at the needs of smartphone applications, there is a clear relation-
ship between these and the needs of web applications in modem browsers. Extensions to 
QUIRE could have ramifications on how code plugins (native code or otherwise) interact 
with one another and with the rest of the Web. Extensions to QUIRE could also form a 
substrate for building a new generation of browsers with smaller trusted computing bases, 
where the elements that compose a web page are separated from one another. This con-
trasts with Chrome [25], where each web page runs as a monolithic entity. Our QUIRE 
work could lead to infrastructure similar, in some respects, to Gazelle [30], which sepa-
rates the principals running in a given web page but lacks QUIRE's provenance system or 
sharing mechanisms. 
An interesting challenge is to harmonize the differences between web pages, which in-
creasingly operate as applications with long-term state and the need for additional security 
privileges, and applications (on smartphones or on desktop computers), where the princi-
ple of least privilege [26] is seemingly violated by running every application with the full 
privileges of the user, whether or not this is necessary or desirable. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This thesis presents QUIRE, a set of extensions to the Android operating system that enable 
applications to propagate call chain context to downstream callees and to authenticate the 
origin of data that they receive indirectly. When remote communication is needed, QUIRE's 
RPC subsystem allows the operating system to embed attestations about message origins 
and the IPC call chain into the request. This allows remote servers to make policy decisions 
based on these attestation. 
The QUIRE design is implemented as a backwards-compatible extension to the Android 
operating system that allows existing Android applications to co-exist with applications that 
make use of QUIRE's services. 
The QUIRE implementation is evaluated by measuring QUIRE's modifications to An-
droid's Binder IPC system with a series ofmicrobenchmarks. Two application designs and 
prototype implementation are presented that use the QUIRE mechanisms to provide click 
fraud prevention and in-app micropayments. 
This thesis shows that a Taos-style system, with applications tracking call chains and 
making signed statements to one another, can be implemented efficiently on a mobile plat-
form, enabling a variety of novel security uses. 
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